We consider a model in which a homogeneous commodity (the resource) is shared by several agents with single-peaked preferences and capacity constraints, and the resource is coming from different suppliers under arbitrary bilateral feasibility constraints: each supplier can only deliver to a certain subset of agents. Examples include balancing the workload of machines, sharing earmarked funds between different projects, and distributing utilities under geographic constraints.
Introduction
Egalitarianism, the central principle of fair division, may conflict with incentives, feasibility or efficiency constraints. Maximizing the leximin ordering over profiles of relevant characteristics (a.k.a. the Rawlsian approach) is the most common implementation of egalitarianism under constraints. It is however a controversial method. Indeed, it recommends to take arbitrarily large amounts of resources from the "rich" if this allows to raise by even a tiny amount the lot of the "poor". The only case where egalitarianism eschews this critique is when we can find a Lorenz dominant distribution of welfare, or resources: at the Lorenz dominant outcome, we simultaneously maximize the share of the k poorest individuals, for any number k of agents. 1 Unlike the leximin ordering that always reaches a unique maximum in any closed convex set, a Lorenz dominant outcome may not exist. We know very few fair division models admitting Lorenz dominating solutions over a reasonably rich domain of problems. The two main instances follow.
Dutta and Ray ( [9] ) observed that the core of a supermodular (convex) cooperative game is one general instance where a Lorenz dominant solution exists; this solution has been known after their work as the egalitarian selection in the core. The second model, due to Sprumont, is the fair division of a single commodity under single-peaked preferences and no free disposal ( [3] , [21] ). The uniform solution selects for each agent either his peak, or a common share in such a way that the resource is fully distributed. Although the original motivation of the uniform solution was its incentive properties ( [3] ), its most compelling fairness property, and its shortest definition, is to be Lorenz dominant among all Pareto Optimal allocations of the resource ( [8] ). While the Lorenz dominance property of the Uniform solution is central in our paper, the solution satisfies many other compelling fairness criteria, see for instance ( [19] ) for an interesting characterization in terms of distributions of shares among agents.
Our Contribution: We study a considerable generalization of the Sprumont model, where a homogeneous commodity (the resource) is still shared by several agents with single-peaked preferences, but the resource is coming from any number of different suppliers, under arbitrary bilateral feasibility constraints: each supplier can only deliver to a certain subset of agents. Examples include earmark constraints: the resource is money, and there are several funds (the suppliers) to support different projects (the agents). 2 Each fund must spend a certain budget, but the earmarks limit the set of projects that a given fund can support. The resource can be water available from several sources, and geographical constraints limit the set of customers (the agents) that a given source can serve. Or the suppliers can be different jobs, each one with a given size in work-hours, to be completed by a set of workers (the agents) with different skills, so that each worker can only perform certain jobs. And so on.
The resources coming from different suppliers are, strictly speaking, different commodities, but any two commodities are perfect substitutes for an agent who can consume both. Thus we speak of a single commodity, like in the original model, but of different resources (the suppliers in the above examples). Our agents have single-peaked preferences over the total amount of commodity they consume. We explore the implications of efficiency (Pareto Optimality), incentive-compatibility, and fairness in our bipartite model.
The set of Pareto Optimal allocations has a much more complicated structure than in the oneresource model. There everyone consumes at most his peak if total demand exceeds the available resource, while everyone consumes at least his peak if total demand is smaller than the available resource. Here a Pareto Optimal allocation involves typically agents consuming more than their peak, as well as agents consuming less. More precisely, the Pareto set is described by a threecomponents partition of the agents and resources: the first set of overdemanded resources are consumed exclusively by the first set of agents, who each receive at most their peak allocation; the second set of underdemanded resources are consumed exclusively by the second set of agents, who each receive at least their peak allocation; and the third set of balanced resources is allocated to the third set of agents, who each receive exactly their peak allocation.
We take Strategyproofness (truthful report of one's preferences is a dominant strategy) as our incentive compatibility design constraint. We identify a canonical Egalitarian solution that generalizes the familiar Uniform solution of the one-resource model. As in that model, this solution selects a Pareto Optimal allocation, defines a Strategyproof direct revelation mechanism, and is fair in the strong sense that it selects the Lorenz dominant Pareto Optimal allocation.
Our axiomatic characterization resembles closely that of the Uniform solution in [21] , [7] , provided we formulate the two equity tests No Envy and Equal Treatment of Equals with more care than in the one-resource model. Given the bilateral constraints, a transfer of resources between two given agents may require to alter the share of a third one. We postulate that Ann's envy of Bob's share is legitimate only if it is feasible to improve her share at the expense only of Bob, i.e., while preserving the shares of every agent other than Bob. Similarly Equal Treatment of Equals is violated only if we can bring Ann's and Bob's shares closer together without altering any other share. Our solution meets both properties. It is characterized by the combination of Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality and Equal Treatment of Equals, just like the Uniform solution in [7] .
Related literature: 1). In a recent paper, Kibris and Kar ([12] ) also consider the division of a single commodity coming from multiple suppliers. Every agent can consume from any supplier, but must receive his entire allocation from a single supplier: in effect, they form coalitions to consume different private goods. It turns out that efficiency is incompatible with using a simple division rule, such as the Uniform rule, for every supplier.
2). The mathematical result driving the structure of the Pareto set is a variant of the GallaiEdmonds (henceforth, GE) decomposition for bipartite flow graphs,(see [16] for a formal treatment, or [5] and [17] for applications in matching).
3). The GE decomposition appears also in our companion paper [4] , where we develop a model of bipartite trade in which both suppliers and demanders are active agents. Each supplier (resp. demander) has single peaked preferences over the amount of commodity he wants to supply (resp. receive); the homogenous commodity can only be transfered across certain bilateral edges. There is a close formal analogy with the current paper, in the sense that the set of relevant Pareto Optimal allocations is described by the same GE decomposition. There is again a Lorenz dominant allocation in the Pareto set, and it defines a Strategyproof direct revelation mechanism. The difference is that, in order to guarantee Voluntary Participation in the mechanism, no supplier (or demander) ever gets to supply (or receive) more than her ideal level. This implies that some suppliers and some demanders consume their peak allocation, and to compute the solution we need only one of the algorithms in Section 5 (the one corresponding to (M − , Q + )).
To see why neither one of the model in [4] and the one here is a special case of the other, consider the impact of destroying one edge in the bipartite graph of compatibility constraints. In [4] this is (weakly) detrimental to the agents at both ends of the edge. By contrast, in our model, dropping an edge can be good or bad news for the agent at one end of this edge, as well as to other agents; this is explained in the concluding section 8. This implies that if the edges are not verifiable (agents can freely claim to be incompatible with some suppliers) our solution is vulnerable to manipulation, while the rule analyzed in [4] is not.
We use in [4] the techniques of flows on graphs, in particular the max-flow min-cut theorem, instead of the GE decomposition. The flow approach simplifies some proofs there, but in the current model it does not appear to work well. The main reason for this is the asymmetric treatment of the two sides in this paper where the supply must be depleted completely by the agents. This hinders the use of flow models where nodes (except the sink and the source) play an identical role. 4). We conclude with three follow up papers. Chandramoulin and Sethuraman ( [6] ) establish that our Egalitarian solution is actually groupstrategyproof, thus answering an open question in an earlier version of this paper (see Proposition 4 in Section 6).
Szwagrzak ([22] ) obtains an alternative characterization of the Egalitarian solution where instead of Strategyproofness he uses a bipartite version of the Preference Replacement property used in [24] to characterize the Uniform rule in the one-resource model.
Finally, Moulin and Sethuraman ( [15] ) discuss the extension to our bipartite model of other solutions of the one-resource rationing problem, such as the Proportional and Equal Losses solutions. Their results depend critically on a Consistency property that plays no role here (but see comment 4 in section 8).
Contents: After a numerical example in the next section, we introduce the model in Section 3, and characterize Pareto optimal allocations in Section 4. The Egalitarian solution is defined in Section 5 and its fairness and incentives properties are the subject of Section 6. Section 7 is the characterization result, and Section 8 collects final comments about variants and possible extensions of our model.
A numerical example
We have four resources r, s, t, u, and four agents A, B, C, D. Figure 1 shows the compatibility constraints: e.g., agent A can consume from any resource, while agent D can only consume from resource u. Total supply 11 + 15 + 8 + 6 = 40 equals total demand 10 + 15 + 10 + 5 = 40. In the one-resource model, this would allow to give every agent her peak allocation. The bipartite constraints do not allow this: A, for instance, must consume at least 11 units, because no one else can consume the first resource. On the other hand, D should not consume more than 5 units in a Pareto optimal allocation: for instance if we give him 6 units, C can get at most 8 units, and transferring one t-unit from D to C is a Pareto improvement.
The three-component partition identifies r as the underdemanded resource, and A as the agent consuming exclusively the r-resources. There are two overdemanded resources t and u, whose resources go exclusively to C and D. Finally resource s is balanced with agent B. By Proposition 1 below, an allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if: A gets 11 units from r; B gets 15 from s; D gets θ units from u, where 4 ≤ θ ≤ 5, and C gets all of t plus (6 − θ) from u. This guarantees that each one of C, D gets no more than his peak. Figure 1 Within the Pareto set, our Egalitarian solution picks the most egalitarian set of shares, corresponding to θ = 5: C gets 9 units and D gets 5.
The model
We have a set M of agents with generic elements i, j, k, · · · , and m = |M |; a set Q of resources with generic element r, s, · · · , and q = |Q|. Resource r is of size ω r , with ω r > 0.
All resources must be allocated between the agents, but each resource can only be assigned to some of the agents. The bipartite graph G, a subset of M × Q, represents the compatibility constraints between resources and agents: ir ∈ G means that it is possible to transfer resource r to agent i. We assume throughout that the graph G is connected, else we can treat each connected component of G as a separate problem.
We use the following notation: for any subsets S ⊆ M, T ⊆ Q the restriction of G is G(S, T ) = G ∩ {S × T } (not necessarily connected); the set of resources compatible with agents in S is f (S) = {r ∈ Q|G(S, {r}) = ∅}, the set of agents compatible with resources in T is g(T ) = {i ∈ M |G({i}, T ) = ∅}.
A transfer of resources from Q to M is described by a G-flow ϕ, i.e., a vector ϕ ∈ R G + such that ϕ ir > 0 ⇒ ir ∈ G. We call a G-flow ϕ feasible if it allocates all the resources and we write x(ϕ) for the allocation it realizes: for all r ∈ Q :
We write F(G; ω) for the set of feasible G-flows, and A(G, ω) = x(F(G; ω)) for the set of allocations achieved by some feasible G-flow. Both sets are obviously non empty. We use the notation x S = i∈S x i , ω T = r∈T ω r etc.. The allocation x ∈ R M is in the lower (resp. upper) core of the cooperative game (M, v) if x M = w(M ), and x S ≥ w(S) (resp.
Lemma 1: Feasible allocations. The following statements are equivalent:
x is in the lower core of the supermodular TU game (M, w), where
v) x is in the upper core of the submodular TU game (M, v), where
Proof: Statement ii) and iii) follow from i) by a standard application of the Marriage Lemma, see [1] .
Statements iv), v).Because G is connected we have w(M ) = ω Q , and v(M ) = ω Q . We let the reader check that (M, w) and (M, v) are dual games, i.e., w(S) + v(M S) = ω Q for all S. thus it it enough to check that (M, v) is submodular. The inequality
To prove i) ⇔ iv), pick x in A(G, ω) and g(T ) ⊆ S. From statements ii) and iii)
Conversely pick x in the lower core of (M, w). For any T ⊆ Q, we have x g(T ) ≥ w(g(T )) ≥ ω T , so by statement ii), x ∈ A(G, ω).
Preferences and Pareto Optimality
Agent i has single-peaked preferences over her total share of resources. A single-peaked preference R i is transitive and complete over the nonnegative real line R + . The symmetric and asymmetric parts of R i are denoted by I i and P i , respectively. Preference R i has a "peak" p[
Let R be the set of single-peaked preferences over R + . A preference profile is then
) i∈M be the associated profile of peaks. Several of our definitions and results use only a single profile. Whenever this causes no confusion, we simply write
An economy is a triple (G, ω, R). An allocation x ∈ A(G, ω) is Pareto Optimal in this economy if for any other x in A(G, ω), we have
We write PO(G, ω, R), for the set of Pareto Optimal allocations of the economy (G, ω, R). The structure of this set is given by a three-component partition of M ∪ Q that we derive as a variant of the classic Gallai-Edmonds decomposition for bipartite graphs ( [16] ). This partition, as well as the set PO(G, ω, R) itself, depend only upon the profile of peaks p[R], but not on the way R i compares allocations across p i .
We call a triple (G, ω, p) a problem, keeping in mind it represents all economies where p is the profile of peaks in R. Until the end of section 5 it is enough to work with problems rather than economies. We define three properties of a problem:
In a balanced problem we can give exactly his peak allocation to every agent. By Lemma 1 in a problem with under-demand we can give each agent at least his peak, and must give strictly more to at least one agent; in a problem with over-demand we can give each agent at most his peak, and must give strictly less to at least one.
We show now that any allocation problem (G, ω, p) can be decomposed in three subproblems, one of each type above, and at most two types may be absent. When we speak of the subproblem restricted to S × T ⊆ M × Q, we mean that the resources in T must be assigned to the agents in S along the restricted graph G(S, T ) (that may not be connected), and for simplicity we write this subproblem as (G(S, T ), ω, p) when in fact only the S-coordinates of p and the T -coordinates of ω matter. In particular the set A(G(S, T ), ω) of feasible allocations is in R S + . Lemma 2: For any problem (G, ω, p) where G is connected, and p ≥ 0, ω 0, there exists unique
We repeat that up to two of the pairs (M + , Q − ), (M 0 , Q 0 ), or (M − , Q + ) may be empty. For instance, if there are no bilateral constraints (G = M × Q), our model is a generalization of Sprumont's, where the GE decomposition reduces to a single component:
See the discussion of this special case after Proposition 2 in section 5.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Fix (G(M, Q), ω, p) and define the partitions with the help of two simple maximization problems.
is supermodular, D is stable by intersection and union. If D = ∅, we define M − as its smallest element, and M − ∪M 0 as its largest element. Set similarly B = arg max T ⊆Q {ω T −p g(T ) } if there is at least one T such that ω T > p g(T ) , B = ∅ else. Then if B = ∅, it is stable by intersection and union, and Q − is its smallest element, while Q − ∪ Q 0 is its largest element.
Suppose first that D and B are both non empty, and check
A symmetrical argument, omitted for brevity, establishes
, and check that Q + , Q 0 , Q − partition Q. We already know that these sets are disjoint. If they are not a partition, the set
This gives a contradiction of the definition of M − :
To check the overdemand in (
We omit the details.
We also omit for brevity the symmetrical proof that (G(M + , Q − ), ω, p) is underdemanded, and the treatment of the remaining cases where at least one of D or B is empty. For instance if they are both empty we have p S ≤ ω f (S) and ω T ≤ p g(T ) for all S ⊆ M, T ⊆ Q, and Lemma 1 implies that (G, ω, p) is balanced; so M = M 0 and Q = Q 0 .
The above proof shows that the canonical partition obtains by maximizing two supermodular set functions, one over the subsets of M , the other those of Q. This can be done by the standard greedy algorithm 3 , of polynomial complexity in the number of nodes |M | + |Q|.
We already described the partition in the example of section 2: 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate a general property, an immediate consequence of Lemma 2: for any pair of agents i, j such that
and if two resources r, s satisfy g(r) ⊆ g(s), then {s ∈ Q − ⇒ r ∈ Q − } and {r ∈ M + ⇒ s ∈ M + }.
We are ready to describe the set PO(G, ω, R) of Pareto Optimal allocations in terms of the canonical decomposition of Lemma 2.
Proposition 1: Fix G and ω. i) For any profile R ∈ R M with peaks p, the set PO(G, ω, R) is non empty, convex and compact;
ii) The property of Pareto Optimality is Peak-Only:
The allocation x is Pareto Optimal if and only if
(recall that A(G(S, T ), ω) is a subset of R S + that only depends upon the S coordinates of ω) In words, agents in M + consume precisely all the resources in Q − , each one gets at least his peak, and at least one, strictly more (Lemma 2); those in M − share the resources in Q + , consume no more than their peak, and at least one gets strictly less; those in M 0 consume the resources in Q 0 and each gets precisely his peak.
The Peak-Only property allows us to write the Pareto Optimal set simply as PO(G, ω, p). From statements iv) and v) in Lemma 1, we can also describe PO(G, ω, p) as the cartesian product of three sets: on M + , the subset of the upper core of (M + , v + ) such that x ≥ p, where v + is the game (3) for the restricted problem (G(M + , Q − ), ω); on M − the subset of the lower core of (M − , w − ) such that x ≤ p, where w − is the game (2) for (G(M − , Q + ), ω); and p on M 0 .
Proof of Proposition 1:
Step 1 We first prove the "if" part of Statement iv). By statement 2 in Lemma 1, and the fact
is balanced. Suppose now that an allocation x satisfying (4), (5), (6) is Pareto dominated by some y ∈ A(G, ω).
on the other hand if y i > x i for some i ∈ M + , this agent with peak p i ≤ x i strictly prefers x i to y i which our assumption precludes. We conclude y = x on M + . The argument establishing y = x on M − is entirely similar.
Step 2 We prove next both the "only if" part of Statement iv), and Statement iii). Note that statements i), ii) are then clear because (4), (5), (6) together define a peak-only, convex and compact set of allocations.
We fix throughout
Step 2 an economy (G, ω, R), a Pareto optimal allocation x, and a flow ϕ implementing x. We color agent i in green if x i < p i , in red if x i > p i , and in black if x i = p i . We also construct a directed graph G ϕ as follows: all edges in G are oriented from M to Q; if ϕ ij > 0, and only then, we add a "backward" edge from resource j to agent i.
We claim there is no directed path 4 in G ϕ from a green agent to a red one. If there was such a path from i to i , we could increase a little the flow along that path (with the convention that increasing the flow on a backward edge amounts to decrease by the same amount the flow ϕ ij in G), and obtain a new allocation where i consumes a little more, i a little less, and everyone else as before; this would contradict Pareto optimality.
Define now X as the set of all green nodes in M together with the nodes in M ∪ Q that one can reach in G ϕ from a green node; Y as the set of nodes in M ∪ Q that are either a red agent, or a node from which one can reach a red node in G ϕ ; and Z as the remaining subset of M ∪ Q. Thus X, Y, Z partition M ∪ Q, and every agent in X ∩ M (resp. Y ∩ M , resp. Z ∩ M ) is green or black (resp. red or black, resp. black). Also, there is no path in G ϕ from X to Z or Y , or from Z to Y .
Step 2.1 In this substep we focus on M − and Q + and show M − , Q + ⊆ X, in particular there is no red agent in M − , and x ≤ p on M − .
Assume to the contrary (
, because all such agents are red or black. We also have x (Y ∪Z)∩M − ≤ ω (Y ∪Z)∩Q + , because the only positive flow out of (Y ∪ Z) ∩ M − goes to (Y ∪ Z) ∩ Q + : it cannot go to X without creating a path in G ϕ from X to Y ∪ Z, and there is no edge from
where the second inequality follows from the fact that there is no edge between an agent in X and a resource in Y ∪ Z. This is the desired contradiction.
Step 2.2 We focus now on M + and Q − , and show M + , Q − ⊆ Y , in particular, there is no green agent in M + , and x ≥ p on M + .
Assume to the contrary (X ∪ Z) ∩ M + = ∅. Then we have
where the first inequality is because the nodes in (X ∪ Z) ∩ M + are green or black, the second is from statement ii in Lemma 2, and the third because there is no edge from X ∪ Z to Y . Similarly we have
where the only differences are that the middle inequality, from statement iii in Lemma 2, is not strict, and the fact that (X ∪ Z) ∩ M 0 could be empty. On the other hand
because the only edges in G to Q − ∪ Q 0 are from M + ∪ M 0 , and a resource in X ∪ Z can receive a positive flow only from one in X ∪ Z. Summing up inequalities (8, 9, 10) , gives a contradiction. Hence (X ∪ Z) ∩ M + must be empty after all, i.e., M + ⊆ Y . Now (10) becomes
We derive a few more facts. First, all inequalities in (9) must be equalities, so
Step 2.3 We focus finally on (
Together with the last statement in step 2.2, this shows that the entire flow from M 0 goes to Q 0 . Assume for a moment that x = p on M 0 : because (G(M 0 , Q 0 ), ω, p) is balanced, this implies that there is no other flow coming to Q 0 , in particular there is no flow on G(M + , Q 0 ), or G(M 0 , Q + ). Finally, as Q + ⊆ X and M + ⊆ Y , there is no flow on G(M + , Q + ) either, which completes the proof of statements iii) and iv).
It remains to show x = p on (Y ∪ Z) ∩ M 0 (we already know it is true on (X ∪ Z) ∩ M 0 from step 2.2). We have
The first inequality because the nodes in Y ∪ Z are red or black, the second one because we saw above that the flow from (
the first one because (G(M 0 , Q 0 ), ω, p) is balanced, the second one because there is no edge from (11) and (12) 
We illustrate Proposition 1 by two examples, each with four agents and four resources. In Figure 3 , the peaks are p = (10, 10, 5, 10) and the resources ω = (11, 10, 8, 9) . The two dashedline boxes show the GE decomposition: resources r, s, t, are under-demanded by A, B, C, u is overdemanded by D ((M 0 , Q 0 ) is absent). Most of the inequalities in the system (4), (5), (6) 
Figure 3
In Figure 4 , we use the same profile of peaks and resources as in the previous example, but the feasibility constraints have changed. The GE decomposition has now agent resources r, s underdemanded by A, while t, u are overdemanded by B, C, D ((M 0 , Q 0 ) is absent). Note that the graph G(M − , Q + ) is disconnected. The system (4), (5), (6) reduces to
The Egalitarian solution
In this section we give an algorithmic definition of the Egalitarian solution, then characterize it as the Lorenz dominant element of the Pareto set.
Given an economy (G, ω, p), we write our solution as E(G, ω, p) and define it separately on M + and on M − . It is a selection from, respectively A(G(M + , Q − ), ω) (see (4)), and A(G(M − , Q + ), ω) (see (6) ). By Pareto Optimality ( (5)
We use an ascending algorithm based on the following system Θ(λ) of inequalities, where λ is a non negative parameter:
where for all i ∈ M + , γ i (λ) = max{λ, p i }, so that p ≤ γ(λ) for all λ. 
submodular, the equality γ S (λ 1 ) = ω f (S)∩Q − is stable by union and intersection of the sets S. We call S 1 the largest such subset. By statement ii) in Lemma 1 applied to G(S 1 , f(S 1 ) ∩ Q − ), the (restricted) allocation γ i (λ 1 ) for the agents in S 1 is feasible by using all the resources in f (S 1 ) ∩ Q − and no more.
In the restricted problem (G(M + S 1 , Q − f (S 1 )), ω) the bilateral graph is described by f 1 (S) = (f (S)f (S 1 )) ∩ Q − . We claim γ S (λ 1 ) < ω f 1 (S) for all non empty S ⊆ M + S 1 . Indeed Θ(λ 1 ) is true and S 1 is the largest set such that the corresponding inequality is tight, therefore
Repeating the argument above, there is a smallest number λ 2 , strictly above λ 1 , at which one of the inequalities γ S (λ) < ω f 1 (S) , S ⊆ M + S 1 , becomes an equality. We call S 2 the largest such subset of M + S 1 . The allocation γ i (λ 2 ) for the agents in S 2 is achievable by using precisely all the resources in f (S 2 )f (S 1 ) (Lemma 1).
Continuing in this fashion, we obtain a partition S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S K , of M + , and a strictly increasing sequence λ 1 < λ 2 < · · · < λ K , such that for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, the allocation γ i (λ k ) to the agents in S k is feasible by assigning the resources in f (S k )f (S 1 ∪· · ·∪S k−1 ) to these agents. By construction this allocation is bounded below by p.
Computing E(G, ω, p) in M − : Turning to the agents in M − , we use a descending algorithm based on the system Ξ(µ) with non negative parameter µ:
where for all i ∈ M − , δ i (µ) = min{µ, p i }, so that δ(µ) ≤ p for all µ.
We have δ(∞) = p, so Ξ(∞) is true, even strictly, because there is overdemand in (G(M − , Q + ), ω, p) (Lemma 2). Also, δ(0) = 0, therefore there is a largest number µ 1 such that one of the inequalities in Ξ(µ 1 ) is tight. We let T 1 be the largest subset of Q + for which we have an equality (its existence guaranteed by the submodularity of T → δ g(T )∩M − (µ 1 ) − ω T ). The allocation δ i (µ 1 ) to the agents of g(T 1 ) ∩ M − is feasible by using exactly the resources in T 1 (statement iii) in Lemma 1 applied to G(g(T 1 ) ∩ M − , T 1 )). We repeat this construction in the restricted problem
We end up with a partition T 1 , · · · , T L of Q + , and a strictly decreasing sequence µ 1 > · · · > µ L , such that for all l, 1 ≤ l ≤ L, the allocation δ i (µ l ) to the agents in g(T l )g(T 1 ∪ · · · ∪ T l−1 ) is feasible by assigning exactly the resources in T l to these agents. By construction this allocation is bounded above by p. This concludes the definition of E(G, ω, p). By Proposition 1, E(G, ω, p) is Pareto Optimal. It is also Peak-Only. The main normative property of our solution relies on the concept of Lorenz dominance. For any finite set N and any z ∈ R N , denote by z * the order statistics of z, obtained by rearranging the coordinates of z in increasing order: z * 1 ≤ z * 2 ≤ · · · ≤ z * n . Say that z Lorenz dominates w,
Finally z is Lorenz dominant in the set A if z LD z for all z ∈ A. Lorenz dominance is a partial ordering: not every set, even convex and compact, admits a Lorenz dominant element. On the other hand, in a convex set A there can be at most one Lorenz dominant element.
Proposition 2: For any economy (G, ω, R) with peaks p, the Egalitarian solution E(G, ω, p) is the Lorenz dominant Pareto Optimal allocation:
Proof of Proposition 2:
We set x = E(G, ω, p). By Proposition 1, we need to prove two statements: the restriction of
. we prove each statement in turn.
Step 1 We write x + for the restriction of x to M + , and show it is Lorenz dominant in
, and in S k we have x + i = max{λ k , p i }. Moreover λ k is strictly increasing in k. We further partition S k as follows
where the strict inequality is explained in the construction of E(p). So A 2 is non empty. And so on. Now we label the agents in M + as {1, 2, · · · , m + } in such a way that x + i is weakly increasing in i, and moreover
• the first |A 1 | terms cover A 1
• the next terms cover a possibly empty subset B 1 of B 1
• the next |A 2 | terms cover A 2
• the next terms cover a possibly empty subset
and so on. This is possible because in A k agent i gets λ k , so in A 1 ∪ · · · ∪ A k−1 no one receives more than λ k−1 ; on the other hand, in B k , k ≥ k, every agent receives no less than λ k ; and the sequence λ k increases strictly. We fix y ∈ A(G(M + , Q − ), ω) and check that it is Lorenz dominated by x + . We use the notation y * (i) = i j=1 y * j . We have y S ≥ y * (|S|) for all S, and if S ⊆ M + is such that y S = y * (|S|) we say that S is a y-tail. Note that our labeling of M + implies that any subset of the form {1, · · · , i} is an x + -tail.
By feasibility (Lemma 1) y S 1 ≤ ω f (S 1 ) = x + S 1 and on the other hand y ≥ x + in B 1 . Therefore
When the above S takes the form {1, · · · , i}, it is an x + -tail, hence we have x + * (|S|) = x + S ≥ y S ≥ y * (|S|). Next we note that
increases weakly in i, so that for i ≤ |A 1 | we have
where the equality is because x + is egalitarian in A 1 . We have proved the desired inequality
Again such a set S is an x + -tail if of the form {1, · · · , i}, so the inequality y * (i) ≤ x + * (i) follows as above for i such that
which will imply y * (i) ≤ x + * (i) because y S ≤ x + S is true both for A 1 ∪ B 1 and A 1 ∪ B 1 ∪ A 2 . Observe that if X, Y, Z are three disjoint subsets, we have
|Y |+|Z| y Y ∪Z is no less than the sum of the |Y | lowest terms in the Y ∪ Z-coordinates of y, and y X is no less than the sum of the |X| lowest terms in its X-coordinates. Applying the claim to
Step 2 We show that x − , the restriction of
Recall that Q + is partitioned as T 1 , · · · , T L , such that the resources of T l are entirely assigned to agents in S l = g(T l )g(T 1 ∪ · · · ∪ T l−1 ), and ω T l = δ S l (µ l ) for all k, where µ l is strictly decreasing; moreover x − i = min{µ l , p i } for i ∈ S l . As in Step 1 we partition S l as follows
The set A 1 is non empty because
and so on. We label the agents in M − so that x − i is weakly increasing in i, and moreover in the sequence {m − , m − − 1, · · · , 1} (with corresponding allocations weakly decreasing), we have
and so on. This is possible because a coordinate in A l receives µ l and one in B l no more than µ l : thus before A l (in A 1 ∪ · · · ∪ A l−1 ) no one gets less than µ l−1 while in B l , l ≥ l, everyone gets at most µ l . For an arbitrary y ∈ A(G(M − , Q + ), ω) we use the notation y
j=m − y * j , so that y S ≤ y * (|S|) for all S. The end of the proof that y is Lorenz dominated by x − is entirely similar to the one in step 1, upon reversing the direction of inequalities. That is, the feasibility constraints ω T ≤ y g(T ) imply now y S 1 ≥ ω T 1 = x − S 1 ; on the other hand y ≤ x − in B 1 , and so (15) follows (up to a change of sign). Similarly the inequality y S 1 ∪S 2 ≥ ω T 1 ∪T 2 = x − S 1 ∪S 2 holds by feasibility of y. We omit the details.
We illustrate the computation of the Egalitarian solution with a few examples.
No bilateral constraints:
Here G is the complete graph G = M × Q. As mentioned already after Lemma 2, the model is equivalent to Sprumont's one-resource model. Suppose first we have overdemand, ω Q < p M . Then M = M − , Q = Q + , and g(T ) = M for all T . Therefore system (14) reads
When µ is the largest number such that this is an equality for some T , it must be an equality for Q, therefore µ 1 solves i∈M min{µ, p i } = ω Q and the algorithm stops after one step. When the resources are underdemanded, ω Q > p M , the algorithm stops similarly in one step: the number λ 1 solves i∈M max{λ, p i } = ω Q , and S 1 = M .
Want all or nothing:
In the one-resource model, the Egalitarian solution when all peaks are zero (resources are all "bad"), is the same as when all are infinite (resources are all "good"), namely it divides the resource equally. This is still true in the bipartite model. By Proposition 1, when p = 0 we have M = M + , Q = Q − , and PO(G, ω, 0) = A(G, ω). Similarly M = M − , Q = Q + when p = ∞, and PO(G, ω, ∞) = A(G, ω). By Proposition 2, the egalitarian solution picks the Lorenz dominant feasible allocation in both problems. Note that it is also the Dutta-Ray egalitarian solution ( [9] ) of the supermodular game (M, w), and of its dual game (M, v).
In the example of Figure 2 (just before Proposition 1), Pareto Optimal allocations assign the 14 units of overdemanded resources t, u to agents C, D, and the 28 units of underdemanded r, s to A, B. The Egalitarian solution is x A = 13, x B = 15, x C = 9, x D = 5.
In the example of Figure 3 (just after Proposition 1), Pareto Optimal allocations distribute 29 units to A, B, C, with peaks 11, 10, 5. This amounts to a one-resource problem, and the Egalitarian solution is x A = 11, x B = 10, x C = 8; and x D = In the example of Figure 4 , we only need to divide 8 units between B, C. Full equality x B = x C = 4 is feasible and stays below both peaks, so it is the Egalitarian solution.
Other properties of the egalitarian rule
Definition: Given the problem (G, ω), a rule selects for every preference profile R ∈ R M a feasible allocation ψ(R) ∈ A(G, ω). We write E for the Egalitarian rule.
We start with the familiar equity test of No Envy, that must be adapted to our model because of the feasibility constraints. In a classic fair division problem, individual shares can always be exchanged between two agents, say agents 1 and 2, without affecting other agents' shares. This is not true in our model. First, the bilateral constraints may prevent us from exchanging x 1 and x 2 . But more importantly, even if this exchange is possible, it may require to alter the allocation of agents other than 1 and 2. We postulate that agent 1's envy of agent 2's allocation is legitimate only if it is feasible to improve upon agent 1's allocation without altering the allocation of anyone other than agent 2.
No Envy: A rule ψ satisfies No Envy if for each R ∈ R M and i, j ∈ M such that ψ j (R)P i ψ i (R), there exists no x ∈ A(G, ω) such that
In the example of Figure 3 , consider the Pareto Optimal allocation (x A , x B , x C ) = (11, 11, 7) , where the burden of overdemand is shared by all 3 agents in M + . If 7P B 11 (recall that the peak of R B is at 10), B envies C, and this is legitimate because (x B , x C ) = (10, 8) is feasible and improves upon B while affecting only C. At the Egalitarian allocation (x A , x B , x C ) = (11, 10, 8) , A envies B but no feasible allocation allows a lower load for A.
The basic horizontal equity property Equal Treatment of Equals must be similarly adapted to take feasibility constraints into account.
Equal Treatment of Equals:
A rule ψ treats equals equally if for each R ∈ R M and {i, j} ⊆ M such that R i = R j , if ψ j (R) = ψ i (R) there exists no x ∈ A(G, ω) such that
The property says that equalizing transfers among agents with identical preferences are legitimate only if they do not disrupt others agents' allocations. This egalitarian requirement is restricted to agents with identical preferences, so it is as weak as in the one-resource mode. For instance consider the rule operating as a serial dictatorship where agent 1 is served first, agent 2 next and so on, at each preference profile where the preferences of all agents differ; and selecting the Egalitarian allocation whenever some two agents exhibit the same preferences. This rule treats equals equally (and is also Pareto optimal). (19) . Write y = ψ(R) and assume without loss of generality y 1 < y 2 . Distinguish two cases. If 1 and 2's common peak p is in ]y 1 , y 2 [, then for ε small enough the allocation z = (1 − ε)y + εx, feasible by convexity of A(G, ω), is Pareto superior to y. If p ≤ y 1 < y 2 , then 2 envies 1, and the allocation x satisfies (18), contradiction.
Proposition 3:
Statement ii) Let R be a profile at which 1 envies 2 via allocation x. From x 1 + x 2 = E 2 (R) + E 1 (R) and the fact that E(R) Lorenz dominates x we must have
and E 2 (R) − E 1 (R) have the same sign, then we have x 1 < E 1 (R) < E 2 (R) < x 2 (or a symmetric condition by exchanging 1 and 2). Now
We turn to Strategyproofness. We decompose it into a monotonicity and an invariance condition, as in [7] . For clarity, we go back to the notation p[R i ] for the peak of R i .
Monotonicity:
A rule ψ is monotonic if for all R ∈ R M , i ∈ M, and
Note that Monotonicity imply own-peak-only, namely p[
: my allocation depends only upon the peak of my preferences.
Strategyproofness: A rule ψ is Strategyproof if for all R ∈ R M , i ∈ M, and
The next Lemma connects these three properties and Pareto Optimality. Proof: Statement i) is proven just as in the one-resource model (see [7] ).
Statement ii) Fix a Pareto Optimal and Strategyproof rule ψ. We show first that the mapping
. The GE decomposition (Lemma 2) is the same in R and (R i , R −i ), so by Pareto Optimality agent i's allocations x i and x i are on the same side of p[R i ]. Now Strategyproofness implies Peak-Only. Next we prove Monotonicity. We fix i, R and R i such that
, and let p, p be the profile of peaks at R and (R i , R −i ) respectively. We also set x i = ψ i (R), x i = ψ i (R i , R −i ). We distinguish two cases.
, so agent i with preferences R * i benefits by reporting R i . The proof of the second property is identical.
Proposition 4:
The Egalitarian rule is Monotonic and Invariant, hence Strategyproof as well.
Proof: We fix (G, ω, c), an agent i and a benchmark profile of peaks p, with corresponding Egalitarian allocation x. We consider a change of peak by agent i only, to p i , and we write p j = p j for all j = i, so that p = (p i , p −i ). The notation M + (p), M − (p ) stands for this component of the GE decomposition (Lemma 2) at p, p , etc...
Step 1 We prove Monotonicity for shifts in
Step 1a Consider a change of peak from p i to p i such that i ∈ M + (p) = M + (p ). Suppose first p i < p i . We show x i ≤ x i by distinguishing two cases. Write in both cases S k , λ k for the partition and corresponding parameters of the ascending algorithm at p, and let i ∈ S , x i = λ k ∨ p i .
First case: p i < λ = x i . Then the partition and corresponding parameters are unchanged at p so that x i = x i . Second case: p i = x i ≥ λ . Then S k , λ k are unchanged for 1 ≤ k ≤ − 1, but S , λ may change. However for λ = p i we have
where we set
. Therefore if S changes, the new set S contains i and λ ≤ p i , hence x i ≤ p i = x i . Suppose next, until the end of step 1a,
i ≥ p i so we are done. We are left with the case p i < p i < x i = λ , that requires more work. We prove by induction on that the first terms S k , λ k ,1 ≤ k ≤ , of the partition and corresponding parameters are unchanged at p . We write S k , λ k for the latter.
, so the claim holds. Next suppose ≥ 2. Assume S 1 = S 1 and derive a contradiction. This implies there exists a coalition S ⊆ M + (p) such that S S 1 and
Indeed suppose (22) fails for all S S 1 : as p and p coincide inside S 1 , we would get S 1 = S 1 . Fix a coalition S as in (22) , that must contain i, hence S ∩ S is non empty. By definition of the ascending algorithm, the sets
In view of (22), we get
As λ is larger than λ 1 , p i , and p i , and S ∩ S is non empty, we get
The desired contradiction follows and we conclude S 1 = S 1 . To show next S 2 = S 2 , we replicate the above argument as follows. If = 2, then j∈S λ 2 ∨p j = j∈S λ 2 ∨ p j for all S ⊆ M + (p)S 1 , because p i , p i < λ 2 , and the claim holds. If ≥ 3 and S 2 = S 2 , we can pick a coalition S ⊆ M + (p)S 1 such that S S 2 and
and proceed as above by decomposing S along S k , 2 ≤ k ≤ K. The induction step is now clear.
Step 1b For a change of peak from p i to p i such that i ∈ M − (p) = M − (p ), the parallel argument is omitted for brevity.
Step 2 We examine the critical peaks at which the GE decomposition change.
Step 2a Suppose i ∈ M + (p). If p i < p i the decomposition does not change, so i ∈ M + (p ). Consider the critical report p * i , p * i > p i , if any, at which the GE decomposition and the status of agent i change. By Lemma 2 ii),
i is the smallest number such that
for some subset S of M + (p) containing i. Let S * be the largest S satisfying (23) (well defined by the usual submodularity argument). Recall from the proof of Lemma 2 that (M − ∪ M 0 )(p) is the largest solution of arg max S⊆M {p S − ω f (S) }. At p * we have max S {p * S − ω f (S) } = max S {p S − ω f (S) } and the largest solution of arg max
Now the restriction of x to M + is in A(G(M + , Q − ), ω) and S * ⊆ M + (p); these two facts imply
In M + we have p ≤ x, so p * i < x i , would give p * S * < x S * , and a contradiction of (23) for S * . Therefore
We show that ψ( R) = E( R). Setting y = ψ( R), x = E( R), by Proposition 2 it is enough to check that the M + -component of y (resp. its M − -component) is Lorenz dominant in the corresponding component of PO(G, ω, R). As explained immediately after the statement of Proposition 1, the M + -component of PO(G, ω, R) contains z ≥ 0 iff z is in the upper core of the submodular game (M + , v + ), where
Similarly the M − -component of PO(G, ω, R) contains z iff z is in the lower core of the supermodular game (M − , w − ) where
(note that, by our choice of p, the constraints z ≤ p are not binding). We use only Equal Treatment of Equals and Pareto Optimality to show y = x on M + . We omit for brevity the similar argument establishing this equality on M − . Set m + = |M + | and recall that y * m + ≥ y * (m + −1) ≥ · · · ≥ y * 1 is the order statistics of y.
Claim 1
Fix an agent i 1 ∈ M + , such that y i 1 = y * m + ; then
Because x Lorenz dominates y, we have y * m + ≥ x * m + . If y i = y * m + for all i ∈ M + then y = x at once and we are done. If y i 1 = 0 (recall in M + all peaks are 0) then x i 1 ≥ 0 implies x i 1 = y i 1 and (26) is again proven. From now on we assume y i 1 > 0, and that there is at least one agent such that y i < y * m + . We show there exists a subset S(i) ⊂ M + such that
Otherwise y S < v + (S) for all S in M + containing i but not i 1 . Choosing ε > 0 smaller than the smallest such difference v + (S) − y S , we see that an ε-transfer from agent i 1 to agent i (a Pigou-Dalton transfer) preserves the core property (inequalities y S ≤ v + (S) for S containing i are automatically satisfied), and y i 1 > 0 ensures the new allocation is non negative. This contradiction of (19) proves (27). Set S * = ∪ i:y i <y * 1 S(i). Submodularity of v + implies y S * = v + (S * ), so
But by construction y j = y * m + ≥ x j for all j ∈ M + S * , therefore x j = y * m + for all j ∈ M + S * . Combining this with y * m + ≥ x * m + proves (26).
Claim 2 Fix an agent i 2 ∈ M + , such that i 2 = i 1 and y i 2 = y * (m + −1) , then
As x Lorenz dominates y, we have
(by Claim 1). If y i = y * (m + −1) for all i ∈ M + i 1 then y ≥ x so y = x by y M + = x M + , and we are done. If y i 2 = 0 then x i 2 ≥ 0 implies x i 2 = y i 2 and (28) is again proven. From now on we assume y i 2 > 0, and that there is at least one agent i ∈ M + such that y i < y * (m + −1) . For any such agent, we claim there is a subset S(i) ⊂ M + such that
Otherwise, we can construct as above a Pigou-Dalton transfer from agent i 2 to agent i, in contradiction of (19) . Set S * = ∪ i:y i <y * 2 S(i), then submodularity of v + gives y S * = v + (S * ), hence
But by construction y j ≥ x j for all j ∈ M + (S * ∪{i 1 }) (as y j ≥ y * 2 ), and M + (S * ∪{i 1 }) contains i 2 . Combining this with y * (m + −1) ≥ x * (m + −1) proves (26) . The inductive argument establishing y = x is now clear.
Step 2 (as in [7] ) We fix an arbitrary profile R * ∈ R M with peaks p, and associated GE decomposition M +,−,0 , Q +,−,0 of (G, ω, p * ). We choose R with peaks p as in step 1, and the additional requirement p * ≤ p on M − and p * = p on M 0 ; we also have
) for the profile equal to R * for agents in S and to R for agents in M S. For any integer n, 0 ≤ n ≤ m, consider the following subset of preference profiles
We prove by induction on n the property H + (n): ψ = E on D n . This is enough because step 1 establishes H + (0), and H + (m) means ψ(R * ) = E(R * ) for an arbitrary R * . Assume H + (n − 1) is true, and fix
where the inductive assumption gives ψ i (R ) = E i (R ) = z i . We compare ψ i (R), E i (R) and z i by distinguishing two cases.
If
by Monotonicity of ψ (Lemma 3) and
. This is a contradiction. If p * i ≤ E i (R) < ψ i (R) the same contradiction obtains by exchanging the role of ψ and E.
We just proved ψ i (R) = E i (R) for i ∈ S ∩ M + . We check it next for M + S. Write ψ(R) = y, E(R) = x, both vectors in M + and y, x their restrictions to M + S, and x their common restriction to S ∩ M + . Consider the set
in the upper core of (M + , v + )} that contains y. Clearly x is still Lorenz dominant in C(R), hence we can mimic the proof of Step 1 to show that Equal Treatment of Equals and Pareto Optimality imply the desired equality of y and
x. The key is that the restriction of the profile R to M + S consists of pairwise identical preferences, therefore we can apply Equal Treatment of Equals to any pair of agents in M + S. To copy the proof of Step 1, observe that C(R) is defined, besides the constraints z ≥ 0, by the inequalities
and the equality z M + S = x M + S . Thus C(R) is the upper core of the submodular game (M + S, v + ) and the proof proceeds exactly as in Step 1. We omit the details.
We also omit the entirely similar proof that ψ i (R) = E i (R) on M − .
Concluding comments
We list first five more natural normative requirements in our model, three of which are satisfied by the Egalitarian rule. 1) Group-Strategyproofness strengthens Strategyproofness by ruling out profitable joint misreports by arbitrary subsets of agents (see e.g. [2] ). It is well known that the Uniform rule in the oneresource model is Group-Strategyproof. Chandranmouli and Sethuraman ( [6] ) recently established that the present Egalitarian rule is Group-Strategyproof as well.
2) Resource Monotonicity requires that the share of every agent increases weakly when the amount of one of the resources (one of the numbers ω r ) increases( [23] ). For instance we go from Figure  1 (section 2) to Figure 2 (section 4) by adding 2 units to resource s, and the Egalitarian solution goes from (11, 15, 9, 5) in Figure 1 to (13, 15, 9, 5) in Figure 2 . Our Egalitarian rule is Resource Monotonic. The proof mimicks that of the analog "Peak Monotonicity" property in the companion paper( [4] ); it is omitted for brevity.
3) Consistency plays a central role in characterizing the parametric rules of the one-resource model (these include the Uniform rule and many more): see [26] and [25] . It can be adapted to our model in two ways, by dropping an agent or dropping a resource. Consider a rule ψ, a problem (M, G, ω, R), and a G-flow ϕ implementing ψ(M, G, ω, R). If agent i leaves with her share of ϕ, we delete from G all edges between i and Q, and reduce the endowment of resource r to ω r (−i) = ω r − ϕ ir . AgentConsistency of ψ requires that ϕ(−i) implements the allocation ψ(M i, G(−i), ω(−i), R −i ). From its Lorenz dominance property, it is clear that the Egalitarian solution is agent-consistent. Symmetrically, Resource-Consistency considers dropping a resource r, deleting from G all edges between M and r, and shifting the preferences of agent i by ϕ ir (so her peak becomes p i − ϕ ir ). Resource-Consistency requires that ϕ(−r) implements the solution ψ(M, G(−r), ω −r , R(−r)). The Egalitarian rule fails this property, as one sees in the examples of Figure 1 and Figure 2 , by dropping resources r, s, t. The reduced one-resource problem has C with peak 2, and D with peak 5, sharing 6 units: the Uniform solution is x C = 2, x D = 4, whereas the Egalitarian solution of the initial problem gives only one unit of resource u to C, and x D = 5.
As mentioned in the introduction, the follow up paper [15] focuses on rules meeting both versions of Consistency. In particular the one-resource Uniform rule admits infinitely many consistent extensions to the bipartite model. 4) Edge Monotonicity: it is natural to think of an edge in G as a resource, and to require that the addition of an edge from agent i to some resource always weakly benefits this agent. But our Egalitarian rule violates this property. Recall that in the example of Figure 2 the Egalitarian solution is (x A , x B , x C , x D ) = (13, 15, 9, 5) . Now add an edge from agent C to resource r: in the new economy, all resources are underdemanded (M = M + , Q = Q − ), and the new Egalitarian allocation is (10.5, 15, 10.5, 6) . Agent A strictly benefits in the change, while D is hurt. If 9P C 10.5, agent C is hurt as well.
Interestingly in the model of our companion paper [4] , with agents on both sides of the edges, we find that the analog Egalitarian rule satisfies Edge Monotonicity. It is unclear which reasonable rules in our model satisfy either Edge Monotonicity or Edge Solidarity (adding an edge affects the welfare of all agents in the same direction).
We discuss finally three extensions of our model. 5) We can add capacity constraints to the total allocation of each agent. Fix c − , c + ∈ R M + such that c − ≤ c + , and insist that an allocation x ∈ R M + is feasible only if c . The GE decomposition (Lemma 2) is unchanged, and so is the description of Pareto optimal allocations (Proposition 1), except for the addition of the capacity constraints. For instance in M + the constraints become x ∈ A(G(M + , Q − ), ω), and p ≤ x ≤ c + : they are compatible because the system (29) is true when p replaces c − .
To define the egalitarian solution in M + , we use the same system Θ(λ) but with the median function γ i (λ) = med{λ, p i , c So our Egalitarian rule passes the version of these two axioms applying only to overlapping (or even equal) capacity ranges, but this is not enough to extend the characterization result.
6) There is a "discrete" variant of our model where indivisible units have to be distributed. Two papers ( [18] , [10] ) characterize in this case the randomized Uniform rule for the one-resource model. It is possible that their result could be adapted to include bilateral constraints.
